Introduction
A major dam development boom is underway in Myanmar. The country is currently planning to build as many as 45 dams (Brennan & Doring, 2014 ) to provide energy for This is a pre-print version of the paper.
The published version is available at: http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10. 1080/07900627.2016.1179176 its economic development and export; 22 projects with a capacity over 10 MW are already operational, according to an energy consultancy. A database, maintained by a major NGO in Myanmar, indicates that 4 dams are currently under construction, while 11 projects are suspended and 1 has been cancelled. These suspensions and the cancellation have been attributed to massive public protests (Burma Rivers Network, 2013 ).
Myanmar's Myitsone Dam in Kachin State is a key example of this opposition against dam projects. Construction was suspended by the Myanmar government in 2011 in response to a widespread opposition campaign (Lynn, 2011) . In 2010, 10 bombs exploded around the dam site, killing at least one Chinese worker (Hadfield, 2014) .
Additional examples of contested dam projects in Myanmar are the Mong Ton Dam in
Shan State, currently at planning and design stage (Mang, 2015) , the Upper Paunlaung Dam in Shan State, currently under construction (Peel, 2014) as well as the Tamanthi Dam in Sagaing Region, currently suspended due to opposition from local groups (Burma Rivers Network, 2013) .
Scholars have recently focused on activism (including activism against large dams) in Southeast Asia. Ford (2013) -considering activism in Cambodia, Indonesia, Malaysia, Myanmar or Thailand -challenges the popular belief that the emergence and success of social activism depends on a considerable measure of democracy. Simpson (2013) echoes this notion analysing the cross-border campaign against dams to be built on the Salween River in Myanmar. Meanwhile, Yasuda (2015) describes NGO advocacy strategies chosen against Laos' Xayaburi Dam. Such campaigns have led to changes in the way hydropower is viewed by national governments and investors, resulting in novel pathways to electricity security being explored, e.g. Thailand starting to look to its neighbours for sources of electricity in the early 1990s (Hirsch, 2010) .
While the value of these analyses for understanding activism against large dams in Southeast Asia is undisputed, these analyses may also be considered partial as the research has mostly investigated only those running the campaigns, but not those the campaigns are aimed at. These are usually dam developers. Chinese developers particularly dominate the industry nowadays; one of those developers, Sinohydro, claims to construct every second dam worldwide (Verhoeven, 2015, p. 178) . Almost no papers investigate the views of Chinese developers on social impact, the social impact assessments (SIAs) conducted or sub-contracted by them, or the resettlement schemes implemented in their projects .
The few papers investigating this topic are, for the most part, not based on direct interaction with Chinese dam developers and additional relevant private sector players. Nordensvard et al. (2015) and ).
Direct scholarly interaction with both activists as well as dam developers and additional relevant private sector players is key in order to comprehensively understand the dynamics of social and environmental activism in Southeast Asia as well as its implications for the region's energy landscape. The aim of this paper is to present such research. For this purpose, the authors of this paper are drawing on more than 150 semistructured interviews carried out during field research in Myanmar, Thailand and Thus, all interviews are coded (see Note for details).
Snowball sampling was employed to recruit interviewees. This approach is frequently necessary when conducting research under less than optimal conditions (Cohen & Arieli, 2011, p. 423) . More formal sampling approaches were tried initially, but envisaged interviewees would not respond to any reach-outs. For instance, an e-mail reach-out to approximately a dozen Chinese dam developers yielded zero replies. The seeds of the eventual snowball sample were recruited via the professional networks of the authors, developed prior to this research, a common approach when snowball sampling (Heckathorn, 2011, p. 356 ff.; Miller & Brewer, 2003, p. 278 ff.) . The sample was terminated when additional interviews yielded limited or no novel insights (thematic saturation) (O'Reilly & Parker, 2012, p. 192 ff.) . The data collected was organized via NVivo 11 with all interviews coded according to a set of predefined themes, e. g. "Myitsone Dam campaign". The resulting clusters were then reviewed and analysed by the authors. Coding on additional sub-themes was conducted, if appropriate.
Via this dataset the interplay of Chinese dam developers and activists opposing large dams were analysed in two case studies: the Myitsone Dam (6,000 MW), a project suspended in 2011 after public protests with no decisions taken to date about its future; and the Mong Ton Dam (7,000 MW), currently in the Environmental and Social Impact Assessment (ESIA) phase with progress currently being interrupted by public protests.
These represent the two largest dam projects in Myanmar.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In the next section, the development and contestation over the Myitsone Dam project is discussed -both from the perspective of the key activists involved in the project as well as China Power Investment Corporation (CPI), the dam developer. This project is then compared to the Mong Ton Dam project. Our subsequent discussions focus on likely ramifications of the current dynamics between Chinese dam developers and activists for Myanmar's energy landscape as well as lessons from dam development in Bhutan for Myanmar. Our argument is summarized in the final section of this paper.
The Case of Myanmar's Myitsone Dam
The Myitsone Dam project, currently suspended, is developed by China Power Investment Corporation (CPI) as well as Asia World, a Burmese dam developer, allegedly one of Myanmar's most successful construction and trading companies which is "owned by regime crony Steven Law" (U. S. Embassy, 2007 Embassy, , 2011 . Basic information and the timeline of the project are depicted in Figure 1 . The exact starting point of this project, the largest of seven dam projects to be developed in Kachin State (Figure 2) , is contested. Villagers reportedly already reached out to the various Kachin ceasefire groups in January 2004 -three years prior to the signing of the MoU -asking them to stop the project (KDNG, 2007) . This was rebutted by an international donor who argued that the campaign against the dam was neither initiated nor led by the (FI8; FNL6) ; the project was suspended 6 days after the end of the exhibition (Lynn, 2011 between USD 30,000 and USD 50,000; the organization currently counts 12 employees, 10 full-time and 2 volunteers (TNL17). As a comparison: CPI, the lead developer constructing the Myitsone Dam, has already spent USD 800 million on the project, according to its calculations (Lwin, 2015) , while the company has a total of approximately 140,000 employees (CPI, 2015) . At first sight, one may be tempted to portray those national civil society organizations advocating against CPI as a classical David-versus-Goliath scenario. One activist interviewed suggested that CPI probably did not take their organization seriously in the beginning (FNL6). Meanwhile, it was suggested by a former employee of a Chinese dam developer that CPI acted cautiously as they "wanted to use Myitsone as their branding project to evidence they know how to do projects overseas" (TP24).
Initially, CPI believed their key stakeholder would be the Burmese government in Naypyidaw, the capital of Myanmar. "The Chinese just spectacularly miscalculated the entire situation. They did not understand that those folks in Naypyidaw have no legitimacy whatsoever in Kachin State", an international donor told us (TI7). "It is a key habit of Chinese enterprises to always follow the government's instruction", a former employee of a Chinese dam developer tried to explain the company's approach (TP24). It is difficult to ascertain the factual basis for these events. The Myitsone Project remains non-transparent on various dimensions, but particularly opaque is the contractual arrangements between CPI and the Burmese government on financial agreements regarding the sale of electricity. Once completed, 90 percent of the electricity generated via the Myitsone Dam is supposed to be exported to China's Yunnan Province (Deetes & Mang, 2015) -in exchange for an estimated USD 500 million annually (KDNG, 2007) . However, the contract between the government and CPI has not been published (FNL4; TP21).
Both activists (FNL3) as well as observers (TI7) It was suggested that as a result of the public protests and resulting suspension CPI changed its approach to managing stakeholders. "They used to only talk to the central government. Now they are inviting us to discuss", an activist in Kachin State acknowledged (TNL17). "You need to address also civil society when developing dams.
We need to explain to the public that these projects are for Myanmar", a spokesperson of a Chinese dam developer said (TP21).
To institutionalize this altered stakeholder management approach, CPI 
The Case of Myanmar's Mong Ton Dam
The contrasting case in this analysis is the Mong Ton Dam, a project that is currently being delayed by public protests in the ESIA phase. Basic information and the timeline of the Mong Tom project are depicted in Figure 3 . The project is the largest of seven dam projects to be developed on the Salween River in Myanmar (Figure 4 ) and the largest ever planned dam project in mainland Southeast Asia (Mang, 2015 Criticism regarding the ESIA process was not only raised by activists, but also by a competitor claiming that SMEC would not contextualize its ESIA approach to
Myanmar (FP23). It was stated by a consultant that SMEC complies with World Bank standards (OP15).
Until now SMEC is the player taking most of the public heat in the Mong Ton Dam project. "This is very much the approach these [Chinese dam developer] players take nowadays. They try to outsource as much as possible, especially when it comes to ESIAs. They hire an international player, they give him a stack of cash and then they say: 'Now you go and deal with this ESIA topic'", an environmental lawyer said (FP16).
This delegation is also a necessity, though, in order to gain credibility, a management consultant noted (TP18); activists would probably not acknowledge an ESIA which was not carried out by an (presumably) independent consultancy, but by the project's developer. Due to these developments many activists interviewed were confident regarding the impact of their campaigns. "I think many more dams will be suspended in the near future", a Burmese activist told us (TNL5). "It has certainly been a trend for the last two years that the population was shouting very loudly against hydropower", a Chinese dam developer (TP21 (Khaing, 2015, p. 10 ). This would mean to "commit to acceptable environmental and social impact". No Chinese (or Thai) investor was explicitly mentioned in the presentation, only names of several European investors (e. g. Andritz or EDF) that had just launched projects in Myanmar (Khaing, 2015, p. 9) . Whether projects implemented by European players adopting benchmark environmental and social safeguard standards truly face less public opposition than Chinese-led projects remains yet to be seen, and this research has not attempted to answer this question, focusing only on dam projects led by Chinese players.
Myanmar's Future Energy
Myanmar needs to develop more sources of electricity to meet the growing demand. Only 49 percent of households currently have electricity connections, with urban areas at 89 percent compared to 28 percent in rural areas (FP30). The country's electricity demand currently grows at 12 percent annually (FP30) with Myanmar's maximum demand forecast to increase from 2.4 GW in 2014 to up to 14.5 GW in 2030 (Khaing, 2015, p. 5) . Development of hydropower may be one avenue to satisfy this demand as Myanmar's hydropower potential is tremendous, with 108 GW of hydropower potential (FP30). These estimates have been significantly corrected upwards in recent years, from only 40 GW six years ago (Middleton et al. (2009, p. 39) .
The Irrawaddy River is considered to have the most hydropower potential (47 percent), followed by the Salween River (38 percent) (FP30).
Many activists interviewed do not absolutely oppose hydropower. However, they prefer small dams with allegedly limited impacts powering Myanmar over large dams with significant impacts powering neighbouring countries (TNL17). Some scholars argue, though, that small dams may not be as sustainable as large dams. First, environmental impacts from a river basin perspective may exceed those of large dams, particularly with regard to habitat and hydrologic change (Kibler & Tullos, 2013) . In addition, in order to produce significant amounts of power, a series of small dams will submerge more land than a single large dam (OA9). This may also imply significant resettlement. Awareness regarding the negative impacts of small dams is limited both among scholars and practitioners nowadays (FA8); a lack of knowledge regarding the social impact of small dams was corroborated by a recent meta-synthesis .
Furthermore, the ability of small dams to provide adequate sources of energy is not supported by Myanmar's Ministry of Electric Power. They have identified 210
potential sites with a capacity of less than 10 MW each. However, the combined installed capacity of these sites would only amount to 232.5 MW, 0.2 percent of the country's total large hydropower potential (Oo, 2012) . Myanmar needs to add up to 1,000 MW of capacity each year until 2030 if current demand growth trends continue (TI9). Even if all small hydropower potential would be developed, this would not be sufficient to power Myanmar's economy ( Figure 5 ). would answer questions that could help verify Myanmar's overall small hydropower potential. Even if small hydropower potential is found to be vast, questions regarding its sustainability remain, though, and a public policy discussion is needed as to whether the country wishes to take this route. 
Myanmar's Dams: Lessons from Bhutan
Large hydropower remains Myanmar's only verified significant potential source for energy. The case of Bhutan may offer valuable lessons to Myanmar on how to reap this potential. 25 years ago, Bhutan was a subsistence economy with one of the lowest GDP per capita, one of the shortest life expectancy as well as the smallest per capita electricity consumption in the world (Dhakal, 1990, p. 291) . Today, its GDP per capita is twice as high as Myanmar's (World Bank, 2015b), its average life expectancy has risen by 15 years to 68 years (World Bank, 2015c) and three-quarter of its population have access to electricity (World Bank, 2015a).
Hydropower has been recognized as the key driving force for the economic development of the country (Tshering & Tamang, 2004, p. 1) . 99% of Bhutan's electricity is from large hydroelectric plants (CIA, 2015) and revenue from the sale of electricity to India contributes to 40% of the country's fiscal revenues (Singh, 2013, p. 460) . Furthermore, hydropower accounts for 25% of Bhutan's GDP, hydropower infrastructure development another 25% (Ogino & Hamanaka, 2011, p. 1) .
Bhutan has commissioned 5 large hydroelectric plants so far with a total capacity of 1,480 MW as well as 21 small run-of-the-river hydroelectric projects (up to 10 MW) with a total capacity of 8.8 MW (UNIDO/ICSHP, 2013) (as a comparison:
Myanmar has a developed hydropower capacity of 3,151 MW (Khaing, 2015, p. 3) ).
Bhutan's largest dam, the 1,020 MW Tala potential stands at 24 GW (22% of Myanmar's total potential), of which only 6% is currently exploited (Ulmasova, 2013, p. 6) . If all ongoing projects are completed on time, the hydropower sector is expected to contribute 75% of Bhutan's fiscal revenues by 2020 (Bisht, 2012, p. 788) . 
Conclusion
"Until the 1970s, it was generally assumed that large dams overwhelmingly contributed more benefits to the society [than] costs" (Biswas, 2012, p. 5) . Indeed, "fifty years ago, the main challenges to large infrastructure projects were technical or scientific. Today, the greatest hurdles faced by such projects are almost always social" (McAdam et al., 2010, p. 401) . Public protests delay large infrastructure projects all around the world. This seems to hold true particularly for hydropower, "perhaps the first sector impacted by the trend" (McAdam et al., 2010, p. 402) . According to Plummer (2013) , extensive resettlement issues are now the second greatest concern of dam developers regarding possible cost and schedule overruns. Electricity export revenues could also contribute significantly to Myanmar's governmental budget if its excess capacity was developed.
The negative social and environmental impacts of large dams can be significantly mitigated "given the present knowledge and experience on planning and management practices" (Tortajada, 2015, p. 405) . However, implementing these practices remains a major challenge (Leung et al., 2013, p. 2) . If more large dams are to be built in Myanmar, dam developers, activists, political leaders and local communities must collaborate in order to minimize adverse social impacts on local communities.
International safeguards must be in place. Schemes are needed that make those resettled as well as those upstream and downstream that are also adversely impacted by the project the first beneficiaries of a project. This is the golden rule of sustainable dam development -a rule which could bring together all stakeholders in Myanmar to find responsible and mutually acceptable energy solutions.
Note
This paper is part of a larger research project investigating various socio-economic impacts of dams which has been reviewed and approved by the University of Oxford's ethics committee. More than 150 semi-structured interviews have been carried out for this project to date. Interview partners are international donors, policy-makers, scholars, consultants, dam developers (including Chinese dam developers), NGOs as well as adversely-affected communities. Only those interviews used in this paper are listed in the table below (Table 2) anonymity. Thus, all interviews are coded with the first letter indicating the mode of interviews (T for telephone, F for face-to-face, O for online survey/e-mail), the second letter indicating the type (A for academia, AA for adversely-affected people, G for government, I for international donor, NI for international NGO, NL for local NGO, P for private sector) and the sequence of numbers indicating the overall interview number within a type.
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